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Post Keynesians define conventions as creeds shared by individuals who use them to 
ground their expectations. Economic policymaking plays a major role in the 
development of conventions. Thus, this article analyses Brazil’s fiscal and monetary 
policies over 2011-2017. First, it shows how the monetary policy over 2011-2014 
wasted the opportunity to establish a lower base rate in Brazil, what we call ‘the 
mistakes of the past’. Second, it argues that the austerity policy implemented after 2015 
formed the convention that public investments are not needed to boost private 
investments; this is what we call ‘the loss of future opportunities’.  
 
1. Introduction 
In Chapter 18 of The General Theory of Employment, Interest and Money (GT), 
and when summarising the book’s idea, Keynes (1964) states that the three variables 
that explain the dynamics of employment, income and wealth creation in the economy 
are the propensity to consume, the expectation of capital assets' future yield and the 
liquidity preference. Amongst these variables, investment expectations and liquidity-
preference are both crucial to galvanising the economy; moreover, they have a strong 
causal relationship: worse expectations lead to liquidity-preference and lower 
productive investment, and vice versa. Also, as expectations and liquidity-preference 
are subjective, they comprise another side of human behaviour, namely uncertainty. In 
view of uncertainty, there is no sureness about the future, only expectations; so, it is 
important to understand the grounds for them. 
Expectations are founded on “partly existing facts which we can assume to be 






with more or less confidence” (Keynes 1964, 147). In the GT, among the more or less 
well known considerations, Keynes highlights one in particular: conventions, which are 
beliefs shared by individuals that help them to form their expectations for the future. 
Among the most important conventions are those as to how to conduct economic 
policies, particularly fiscal, monetary and exchange policies. They are responsible for 
constituting a basis for private expectations and also, nonetheless, for shaping an 
institutional structure that creates an environment favourable to private sector decisions 
to invest, which are fundamental to long-term economic dynamics. 
Given that, the aim of this article is to examine the Brazilian economic policies, 
particularly monetary and fiscal policies, from 2011 to 2017. In this context, two 
analyses specifically are performed. On the one hand, it is shown how the adoption of 
economic policies from 2011 to 2014 brought conventions into disarray, thus wasting 
the opportunity to bring the historically high Brazilian interest rates to a lower plateau. 
We call this wasted opportunity as ‘the mistakes of the past’. On the other hand, this 
contribution describes and analyses how, after 2015, fiscal policy has been structured 
along ‘expansionary contraction’ lines, both in efforts to achieve a short-term fiscal 
adjustment; and in the proposed New Fiscal Regime, the so-called ‘Fiscal Spending Cap 
Amendment’ approved by the National Congress in December 2016, also supported by 
the Michel Temer government, which constrained public spending in the government’s 
endeavour to forcefully deliver fiscal consolidation. The idea is to make it clear that, 
had a fiscal reform along the lines of Keynesian proposals occurred, there would have 
been a chance of forming more optimistic long-terms conventions, rather than ‘wasting 
future opportunities’, as it is termed here. 
To that end, section two discusses the role of conventions in the formation of 






monetary policy in the period 2011 to 2014 and the fiscal policy post-2015, in order, 
respectively, to point to ‘the mistakes of the past’ and the ‘waste of future 
opportunities’. In this sense, the third section examines the monetary policy over 2011-
2014 to show the ‘mistakes of the past’, while the fourth section presents the ‘waste of 
future opportunities’ as being the fiscal consolidation adopted in Brazil in the period 
after 2015. The fifth section offers some final remarks. 
 
2. The role of conventions in the formation of expectations 
On a number of occasions, Keynes made it clear that Economics is a moral 
science and thus deals with human behaviour.1 In that respect, and in the Treatise on 
Probability (TP), Keynes, (1921) went as far as to present an epistemological model to 
understand human reasoning, at least at the individual decision-making level. It is in 
this respect that conventions influence expectations. In the TP, Keynes (op. cit.) sets 
himself a complex task, namely to show that the reasoning that proves itself mistaken is 
just as rational as that which proves right. In this respect, he asks “is it certain that 
Newton and Huyghens were only reasonable when their theories were true, and that 
their mistakes were the fruit of a disordered fancy?” (Keynes 1921, 284). In order to 
address that task, Keynes developed an epistemological analysis in the TP upon which it 
is possible to understand the ‘Keynesian entrepreneur’ of the GT. 
Knowledge begins with ‘direct acquaintance’, that is, the absorption of some 
datum or evidence by means of an inborn human ability to perceive facts by experience, 
to understand meanings and to use them as appropriate. Direct acquaintance offers 
individuals a series of data that they know with greater or lesser certainty, constituting 






upon which to form propositions, which the TP defines as indirect knowledge; that is, 
something that necessarily goes beyond the series of data from which it is formed.2  
Such a proposition, the indirect knowledge, is precisely the entrepreneurs’ 
expectations for the future. It is produced by an inductive reasoning, which draws on 
particulars (data/evidence, direct knowledge) in order to attain a general argument 
(proposition/conclusion, indirect knowledge), and “shares the uncertainty to which all 
inductions are liable” (Keynes 1921, 95). 
The data from which individuals acquire direct knowledge include this belief 
shared with other individuals, that is, conventions, even though “convention is not 
rooted in secure knowledge” (Keynes 1964, 204). Thus, a convention is a prevailing 
shared conviction over time, which economic agents add to their direct knowledge. This 
is, if not because they hold it as the truth, at least because “worldly wisdom teaches that 
it is better for reputation to fail conventionally than to succeed unconventionally” 
(Keynes 1964, 158). 
Moreover, given that a convention can be “a tool to coordinate expectations, to 
inform each one about what others expect as an outcome of a given stimulus” (Carvalho 
2014, 257, translated by the authors), the greater other economic agents’ adherence to a 
given convention is, it inspires greater confidence of each individual in the future 
continuity and rightness of this convention in particular – a type of self-fulfilling 
prophecy. Therefore, governments, which are the greatest social entity and have the 
power of creating and enforcing public policy, play a key role in forming conventions 
and consequently in establishing expectations.  
With this in mind, one can understand why Keynes proposed ways of 
conducting economic policy.3 Restricting our presentation to monetary and fiscal 






Filho (2018) show, its utmost intention is the achievement of full employment. This 
intention, however, should align with other economic policies, because monetary policy 
alone is unable to accomplish it, and coordination of policies is very important. 
Nonetheless, Keynes (1982) argues that monetary policy has other five goals under its 
direct responsibility: prices, exchange rate, liquidity, financial and expectations 
stabilities. In that connection, Arestis, Terra and Ferrari Filho (2018) point out that, in 
his various writings, Keynes showed that central banks have three instruments with 
which to attain their immediate goals: the interest rate, regulation and debt 
administration. 
The base interest rate is “the governor of the whole system” (Keynes 1971, 189) 
so that it is the main tool of monetary policy and acts on economic agents’ liquidity-
preference, which, on the one hand, depends on the economic agents’ expectations and, 
on the other, explains the reason for speculative demand for money and so defines the 
market interest rate. In light of this argument, the central bank has to build positive 
conventions regarding how it intends to administer its base rate over time. In fact, 
Keynes makes it clear that “a monetary policy which strikes public opinion as being 
experimental in character or easily liable to change may fail” (Keynes 1964, 203). 
However, it “may prove easily successful if it appeals to public opinion as being 
reasonable and practicable and in the public interest, rooted in strong conviction, and 
promoted by an authority unlikely to be superseded” (Keynes 1964, 203). 
In terms of fiscal policy, Keynes (1980) proposed a progressive tax policy, that 
should raise funds to finance public spending and promote income distribution. 
Spending, in turn, would comprise a budget segregated into current and capital 
expenditures. Current expenditures would finance public services and should tend to 






cycle via long-term public investment programmes, that is, to build infrastructure for 
the private productive structure - which if not undertaken by the State, it cannot be 
initiated. Clearly, the State is thus not to compete with the private sector, but to 
cooperate with it, aiming at creating a crowding in effect. 
It is important to note that the capital budget should be financed by taxes and by 
the current budget surpluses. Moreover, it should be counter-cyclic: in an economic 
boom, public investments should diminish, but they would expand at the first signs that 
effective demand is cooling, so as to fill the gap left by reduced private spending. In this 
way, fiscal policy would anchor positive conventions as to the future and would seek to 
promote private crowding-in. For this reason, Keynes (1980) was concerned that there 
should be no deficit financing of the public budget, because this could both undermine 
confidence about future State financing and put pressure on short- and long-term 
interest rates, as a result of public demand for liquidity in the financial system. 
One last point concerning conventions and economic policy, Ferrari Filho and 
Conceição (2005) argue that Keynes’s (1964) notion of ‘socialisation of investment’ can 
be understood as the State constructing a stable institutional structure, favourable to 
private spending. Thus, stable rules are needed to foster conventions, embodying the 
belief in the permanence of the present state of affairs in the future, which is 
fundamental for entrepreneurs to invest. 
 
3. Monetary policy from 2011 to 2014: ‘the mistakes of the past’ 
In the early months of 2011, the then elected Dilma Rousseff government sought 
to gain credibility: the primary surplus target was announced as in excess of 3% of GDP 
(and was met) and the Central Bank of Brazil (BCB) raised the base (Selic) interest rate 






Policy Committee embarked on a process of reducing the Selic rate, to everyone’s 
surprise, and this continued until October 2012, when the rate reached what was then its 
lowest value ever, 7.25% per year. 
The BCB’s actions successfully managed to lead conventions and market 
expectations along as shown in Graph 1. Although inflation in 2010 was 5.91%, nearing 
the upper target bound of 6.5% (BCB 2018), market conventions were positive as 
regards monetary policy. For that reason, the DI pre-360 ex ante market rate – which 
prices in the present the expected annual interest rate – started forecasting a steadily 
lower future Selic rate, as the line traced in the Graph reports. 
 
Source: BCB (2018). 
Note: (i) The expected inflation gap is the difference between the inflation expected at each point and its 
average value over the whole period. 
 
Accordingly, economic agents – not just financial market operators, but all those 
with an active position on interest rates, such as families and companies carrying 
portfolios of financial assets and savings accounts – purchased at lower nominal and 
real interest rates, and relied on that scenario continuing from that point on into the 
future. One of the central reasons for this was the diminishing expected inflation gap, 






















































































































































































Graph 1 - Brazilian Central Bank Interest Rate, Market Future 
Interest Rate and Expected Inflation Gap, 01/2011 to 12/2016






relative to the Graph’s secondary axis displays. As inflation is a risk that erodes asset 
values (particularly fixed income ones), the lower its future expected rates are, the lesser 
is the asked liquidity-preference premium, enabling lower interest rates. In short, from 
2011 to mid-2013, the reduction of the Selic rate was successful and established the 
convention that future interest rates would remain at low levels. 
Why did conventions change? Graph 1 shows that, from mid-2013 on, future 
interest rates began to embody a higher risk premium. Worse, future conventions began 
to contaminate expectations, and the expected inflation gap migrated to the positive 
field. What was happening? Conventions were in disarray in various domains. In the 
monetary domain, the government begun to use the upper bound of the band as its 
pursued inflation target. Inflation rate in Brazil reached 6.5% in 2011, 5.84% in 2012, 
5.91% in 2013 and 6.41% in 2014 (BCB 2018), amounting to prices 27% high in four 
years. Obviously, in view of the risk of wealth being eroded by inflation, any 
relinquishing of liquidity would call for a higher liquidity premium: market interest 
rates started going up and began to decouple from the Selic rate. 
The reasons why inflation behaved in this way are to be found, on the one hand, 
on cost factors, namely the BCB’s controlled exchange devaluation, in which the US 
dollar appreciated by an accumulated 42% between January 2011 and December 2013 
(BCB 2018) and increasing commodity prices, that rose by 11% at that same period 
(BCB 2018), pressuring production costs and thus prices. On the other hand, after 2012, 
demand factors also exerted a role on pushing inflation up, especially so as the 
government expanded its own spending, particularly in public consumption. As SPE 
(2018) reports, the government gave a fiscal stimulus equivalent to 0.6% of GDP in 
2012 and 1% in 2013, with public consumption growing at a mean quarterly rate of 






In that period, however, as a result of expanding household consumption, which 
was growing at a mean quarterly rate of 4%, private enterprise was increasing its gross 
fixed capital formation by a quarterly mean of around 4.5%. That is, the government 
stepped on the fiscal accelerator at a moment when private enterprise was also 
accelerating. Finally, in the same period, exports also grew by a higher quarterly mean 
of 3.1%. Accordingly, Brazil was not facing problems of demand; on the contrary, the 
constraints encountered were supply issues, as the mean quarterly expansion of 7.5% in 
imports, which meant a variation of 17% in the imported quantum between January 
2011 and December 2013. It is also worth highlighting that this rising  quantity reached  
48% more in October 2013 in relation to January 2011 (IBGE 2018); and that was so  
despite  the mentioned exchange rate depreciation observed between  2011 and 2013. 
An accelerating demand, in turn, encountered quite a buoyant labour market, 
with unemployment rates falling from 6% in January 2011 to 4.3% in December 2013, 
as shown by the former monthly employment survey, or from 7.9% in the first quarter 
of 2012 to 6.2% in the last quarter of 2013, in figures of the actual unemployment 
research in Brazil4 (IBGE 2018). Low unemployment pushed wages up and the labour 
real income expanded by a moving average of 2.1% in 2012 and 3.7% in 2013 (IBGE 
2018). Of course, higher wages meant increases in costs, which were passed on to 
prices. Also, to demonstrate how Brazil was facing constraints to expand its production, 
the mean installed industrial capacity was 82% in the period, meaning a lack of supply 
to meet an accelerating demand (BCB 2018). 
The inflationary pressures thus came from both rising costs and the lack of 
labour supply to cope with a growing aggregate demand. Thereafter, if the BCB’s 
intention was to reduce the Selic rate to historically low levels, while devaluing Brazil’s 






budget growth. Private investment was doing its part, at mean quarterly growth rates of 
6.9% in 2011, 0.8% in 2012 and 5.8% in 2013. 
Despite these cost-demand factors acting on inflation, there were four other 
‘mistakes of the past’, three of them were still related to fiscal issues and all conspired 
to dissipate the opportunity for low interest rates to be maintained and become a 
convention: (i) fiscal expansion was carried out in a manner that lacked credibility, 
using devices that inspired mistrust (among them the ‘creative accounting’5 or the use of 
non-recurrent funds, such as selling oil fields, which are State owned by law); (ii) the 
efforts to communicate fiscal policy measures to public opinion were particularly poor 
and limited to an insistence on announcing unrealistic revenue expansion and primary 
surplus goals; (iii) fiscal policy gave out conflicting signals, in that a tax relief policy 
was introduced between 2011 and 2014 in parallel with increasing public outgoings 
(Resende and Terra 2017, 263-264). As growing public investment and consumption 
were happening together, with large tax exemptions, the primary balance was 
incompatible with forming the surplus required to sustain the federal government large 
disbursements on interest and amortization; thereby making the nominal deficits of the 
government grow steadily, which needed to be financed by an increasing public debt 
and at a higher interest rate. Thus, the ratio of the federal interest payments to GDP 
went up from an average of 3.05% in 2013 to 6.07% in 2015 (IPEADATA 2018);6 and 
(iv) coming back to monetary policy, the government used price freezing to control 
inflation, a method the Brazilian people are very sensitive to, and suspicious of the 
result of their experiences with high inflation in the 1980s and 1990s. 
To sum up ‘the mistakes of the past’, the interest rate reductions between 2011 
and 2012 were successful, in that they managed to form conventions that generated 






interest rates are the price of liquidity-preference and depend on conventional relations 
and the state of expectations, from mid-2013 onwards, economic agents’ expectations 
reversed, because the economic authorities decided to accelerate demand in Brazil, an 
endeavour to achieve high levels of economic growth at a time when it was not demand 
that was proving insufficient and thus did not need to be accelerated, but merely 
maintained. As Keynes (1964) shows, stimuli on effective demand have repercussions 
on production and prices. In Brazil from 2011 to 2013, supply was quite inelastic, so 
that prices responded more intensely, when cost-push inflation was already in place, 
strengthening economic agents’ perceptions of the risk of inflation. When this became a 
convention and economic agents began to price inflation into premiums for 
relinquishing the liquidity they held, market interest rates increased (see Graph 1), 
obliging the BCB to resume Selic rate increases in mid-2013.  Had it not been done so, 
the BCB would have been unable to control the short end of the interest rate curve, 
which would be even more serious for private investment. 
Lastly, an exogenous element was also making things harder for the Brazilian 
economy. In 2014, the ‘Operation Carwash’ lawsuit, an economically significant factor, 
although not produced by economic policy, but  due to the already in course ‘mistakes 
of the past’ that worsen expectations and foster pessimistic conventions and greater 
liquidity-preference, partly explain the abrupt and deep two-year Brazilian recession, 
2015 and 2016. ‘Operation Carwash’ directly affected Brazil’s largest corporation, 
Petrobras (which alone accounted for 8.9% of aggregate investment in Brazil in 2013 
(Loural 2016)), as well as major contractors, responsible for building infrastructure 
investments. As a result, aggregate investment declined by 13.9% in real terms in 2015 







4. Fiscal policy after 2015: ‘loss of future opportunities’ 
As mentioned before, the Dilma Rousseff government’s lack of fiscal control 
from 2014 onwards,7 increased public indebtedness and strongly pushed up interest 
rates on National Treasury bonds. Finally, in an attempt to solve the issue, fiscal 
austerity measures were undertaken, at first short-term ones through a sweeping 
programme of reducing public spending, but later, December 2016, it was swapped to a 
structural, permanent policy, under the enforcement of a constitutional rule assuring the 
New Fiscal Regime (NFR). Thus, unlike of the ‘mistakes of the past’, in which there 
was an accelerating demand, what came into play in Brazil after 2015 was insufficient 
demand, precisely the opposite of what had existed previously. In that situation, in 
which State action was called for, it was not forthcoming. 
The short-term adjustment of 2015-2016 was carried out on the basis of 
restrictions on the release of public expenditures. In 2015, these failed to yield results, 
as total real expenditures rose; however, in 2016 they did decline in real terms to levels 
close to those of 2014 (TN 2018). By late 2016, fiscal consolidation entered a new 
phase in that the NFR limited any increase in public spending to slow inflation, as 
measured by the consumer price index. In that way, the NFR made clear its intention to 
reduce State participation in the economy. The short-term adjustment of 2015-2016 
harmed the State’s ability to galvanise the economy; the structural adjustment resulted 
in a structural compression of public investments. 
Certainly, 2015 and 2016 were years in which the federal government needed to 
reorder its finances, because economic agents’ conventions regarding the sustainability 
of the federal budget were considerably negative, entailing risk premiums that called for 
higher annual interest rates, which helped raising interest payments from 3.5% do GDP 






spending austerity might have fostered conventions of fiscal reorganisation, it was 
unlikely to foster conventions of an expanding economic dynamic that were sufficiently 
vigorous to become something private investment could count on. 
Moreover, it is questionable whether the expectation of fiscal austerity would 
foster optimistic conventions regarding the adjustment of public accounts. This is so 
because instead of contributing to shrinking effective demand and thus GDP, the cut in 
public spending in a scenario of economic recession helped to lead to a fall in 
government revenue. Once again, the fiscal policy adopted was pro-cyclical, stimulating 
negative conventions; not only regarding the lack of fiscal equilibrium but also the 
federal government’s inability to lead a recovery from the recession that worsened over 
the course of 2015.  
Thus, given the degree of Brazil’s budget rigidity, with receipts legally attached 
to a specific spending, which leaves no easy margins of manoeuvre for changing the 
destination of the expense, the fiscal adjustment should have proposed emergency 
expansion of revenue, partly in order to restore the primary surplus, and partly to 
supplement credit in public investment. In fact, there was little political scope for 
Brazil’s congress to support such measures, but no proposals in this direction even 
emerged from the parliamentary debates, and no conventions were formed concerning 
options, except harmful austerity.8 
As regards the structural adjustment via the NFR, the convention that has 
become established since then is that the government will make no further public 
investments. In our view, the NFR should actually have looked at both sides of any 
fiscal policy: public revenues and expenditure of public funds. Nonetheless, the one 
passed in Brazil limited itself to considering primary expenditures, with no rationale 






independent of the behaviour of public revenues or GDP, with expenditures being 
corrected solely by inflation. Having begun the NFR with a ceiling limiting overall 
expenditures and with no subsequent measures being approved to enable compliance 
with the rule, it remained to the government  – immediately rather than gradually – to 
compress public investments; this is   one of the few non-rigid expenditures used as an 
escape way  in order to comply with the upper limit rule. 
The NFR was a lost opportunity because in addition to disregarding taxation, it 
missed the chance to build a budget organization in Brazil that would use public 
investment effectively to stabilize the economic cycle, by counter-cyclic administration 
of investment outgoings and with no need to incur fiscal deficits for that purpose. If the 
fiscal adjustment process had been widely discussed with public opinion and if there 
had been a commitment by the State (including Brazil’s states and municipalities and 
not just the federal government) to balance the public sector, positive conventions could 
have arisen; thereby contributing to the formation of expectations favourable to private 
investment decision-making. 
Instead of relying on expansionary fiscal contraction, the logic of Keynes (1980) 
would demand expansionary fiscal responsibility through the building of a fiscal regime 
with a trimmer, less rigid current budget and primary surplus targets designed to finance 
investments in a capital budget. In fact, the fiscal consolidation debate in Brazil is 
structural, not so much in the sense that the State is too large, but on the rationale that 
public expenditures do little to promote conventions in favour of investment. Brazil 









5. Final remarks 
Conventions are shared beliefs that ground expectations, although they are just 
as subjective as expectations themselves. The effect of economic policy depends greatly 
on its success in building (or not hindering) economic agents’ conventions and 
maintaining them over time. In this respect, the analyses of the undertaken monetary 
policy between 2011 and 2014, and fiscal policy after 2015, show the importance of 
administering economic agents’ conventions, both so as not to transform an initially 
successful policy into a disaster (as with the interest base rate reductions over 2011-
2014) and not to lose the opportunity to build a public budget that serves as effective 
anchorage and complementation for private investments (unlike the short-term fiscal 
adjustment of 2015 and 2016 and the structural adjustment, via the NFR, after 
December 2016). 
The convention post-NFR is that there will be no more public investment to 
serve as a beacon for private investments – this stimulus to private investment is, as 
mentioned above, unrelated to tax relief, subsidies or trade barriers, which generate only 
privileges and distortions. Brazil has scanty infrastructure on which a private structure 
can be built upon. Accordingly, with the NFR in place, there is no room for the public 
sector to galvanise such a structure, and the domestic rate of return on such investments 
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1 For Keynes, the idea of Economics being a Moral Science is very clear in a letter he wrote to Roy 
Harrod in 1938. In this letter, Keynes states “I also want to emphasise strongly the point about economics 
being a moral science [...] it deals with motives, expectations, psychological uncertainties.” (Keynes 
1973, 300). 
2 For this reason also, (i) it is not excessive to say that, in the GT, uncertainty is a result of the 
epistemological model formulated by Keynes in the TP and not an ad hoc hypothesis necessary to the 
book’s theoretical analysis; and (ii) the fundamental uncertainty based  on the fact that not all the data 
relevant to taking a decision are  available, stems from the nature of inductive reasoning, whose 
propositions always go beyond the evidence substantiating them, to create a priori a conclusion that 
exists for the decision maker alone. 
3 The economic policy agenda proposed by Keynes is known to address both fiscal, monetary and trade 
issues as well as structural changes. 
4 This new research is the ‘Continuous National Survey by Household Sample’ (in Portuguese, Pesquisa 
Nacional por Amostra de Domicílios Contínua, PNAD), which is the Brazilian unemployment survey 
since 2012. To illustrate the period prior to 2012 we reported both data. 
5 ‘Creative accounting’ is the use of artificial manners to reach fiscal equilibrium. The most famous 
creative accounting method was the so-called ‘fourfold operation’, evolving the exchange of resources 
between the State and its own firms. The four public entities that took part in the scheme were the 
National Sovereign Fund, National Treasury, BNDES (public development bank) and Caixa Econômica 
Federal (commercial public bank). They changed assets and loans between them in such a way that in the 
end the National Treasure accomplished the amount necessary to fulfil the primary balance surplus it had 
committed with the Brazilian Parliament. To see more on this odd public finance behaviour, see 
Villaverde (2016). 
6 Itens (i) to (iii) pushed the long-end of the yield curve up, and forced the Selic up; otherwise the BCB 
would have less influence over the term structure of the interest rate in Brazil. 
7 SPE (2018) shows there was a structural deficit from 2013 onwards, which was only covered with 






8 Had there been such political scope, the necessary redressing of fiscal balance should also have been 
achieved by permanently increasing government revenues, with a view to prevent further worsening in 
deficient demand in a context of economic slowing or recession, by way of taxation on the wealthiest. 
However, proposals such as taxation of profits and dividends – which Gobetti and Orair (2016) argue, 
would constitute an important reinforcement to the fiscal adjustment – taxation of inheritances and 
regulation of the tax on large fortunes, and other measures, were not considered. 
